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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STjATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * *

WELBY J. VAN DYKE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 890133
-vsPriority 14 b

MARION GLEN CHAPPELL and
DEMA RUTH CHAPPELL,
Defendants and
Appellants.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The nature of the case, the course of proceedings and
disposition of the case in the Sixth Judicial District Court
are as stated in the Brief of the AppelJLant.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTER FOR REVIEW
1.

Does the record support the findings of the District

Court that an existing fence observed, acquiesced

in

and

repaired by the parties for a period of more than 77 years
become a property boundary by acquiescence?
2.

Does

the

status

of

a

boundary

line

fence

by

acquiescence change because the fence also controls livestock
of adjoining landowners?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES.
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS
This appeal does not present any constitutional provision,
statute, ordinance, rule or regulation the interpretation of
which would be determinative of the issues of this case.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Van Dyke is the owner of real property located in Wayne
County, State of Utah, the boundary of which is the subject
matter of this action.

Van Dyke's property is bounded by an

ancient fence on the south.1
Chappells are the owners of real property located south of
the Plaintiff's property and bounded on the north by the common
ancient fence between the respective tracts.2
The Chappells caused their property to be surveyed in June
of 1987.
not

on

Chappells' surveyor concluded the ancient fence was
the

record

boundary

between

the

properties

but

encroached upon Chappells' property3 causing a dispute which
resulted in this litigation.
The evidence is uncontradicted that the fence between the
1

Exhibits:
6 & 19 - Deeds to respective parties
8, 9, 17 - County plats and survey plats

2

Exhibits:
6 & 19 - Deeds to respective parties
8, 9, 17 - County plats and survey plats

3

Exhibit 17 - Surveyor's plat
Tr. 137, 138 (Testimony of Rodney Torgerson, Surveyor)
2

parties was constructed of permanent cedar posts and poles
about the year of 1911.4

The fence was built as a joint

fencing project between Benjamin Turner, a predecessor in title
to Van Dyke and by George Chappell, a predecessor in title to
the Chappells.5

The fence between the properties of Van Dyke

and Chappells extends to the east and separates properties of
other owners on the south of the fence from properties on the
north of the fence;6 the fence likewise extends to the west
beyond the property of Chappells and divides properties owned
by others (Max Chappell) on the south of the fence of Van Dyke
who owns property on the north.

The fence continues on a

virtually

the properties

due west

course

beyond

of these

parties, dividing lands of other proprietors on the north and
south, respectively.7

The fence continues to run to the west

as outlined for a distance of approximately three miles across

4

Tr.l31, Glen Chappell. age 80 (father of Appellant)
Tr.131, L3: "As I can tell for sure. 3ft was built
about 1911."
Tr.18, 19: Van Dyke, age 78, observed maintained integrity of
fence for 64 years.
Tr.42,43: Laverl Torgerson. age 78, observed maintained
integrity of fence for 69 years.
Tr.121: Marion Glen Chappell. age 37 - fence there during his
entire lifetime.
Tr.5: Rene Van Dyke, age 33 - observed maintained integrity
of fence for 25 years.
5

Tr.l27, L 21.

6

Tr.55; Tr.63,65; See Exs 14, 15-16 (aerial photos)

7

Tr.40; Tr.55; Tr.61-62; See Exs. 14, 15-16.

3

the Lyman-Loa valley.8

The line in question is the center line

of the section (§9) running east and west.*
The

fence

in

dispute

was

repaired

and

improved

by

replacing part of the poles with net wire in the year of 1933
or 1934.9

Van Dyke's predecessor in interest, Benjamin Turner,

furnished the materials to go into the fence and the owners of
the property south of the fenceline furnished the labor for the
fence repair and neither the alignment nor the location was
changed.10
The field notes of a 1966 survey authorized by the Bureau
of Land Management relied heavily upon a survey of 1935.

The

field notes show that none of the section corners of Section 9,
Township 28 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian
were in place.

The surveyors relied upon the fences in place

to re-establish the corners and quarter corners.

One of the

fences relied upon was a west extension of the fence which is
the subject matter of this litigation.11
The parties to this action and their predecessors have
acquiesced in the boundary line fence for a period of at least
8

Tr.39, 40; Tr. 55; Exs. 14, 15, 16.
*Exs. 7, 8, 9 and 17.

9

Tr.22; Tr.44;Tr. 51.

10

Tr.22; Tr.44; Tr.51.

i:L

Ex. 10, Field Notes, p. 336: "Point for the 1/4 sec.
corner of sees. 8 and 9 as determined by old property fence
cor. bears E., W. and N., and it's believed to be a
perpetuation of the original cor. position."
4

77 years.

The Chappells have recognized Van Dyke's ownership

in the property immediately north of the boundary fence.12
In the year of 1984 Chappells secured permission from Van
Dyke to build a corral upon property north of and bounded on
the south by the fence.13

Chappells removed the improvements

when requested to do so and paid Van Dyke rent for the use of
the land north of the fence.14
Van

Dyke

and

his predecessors

in title have had the

continuous use and occupancy of the real property north of the
old

fenceline

predecessors

(T.19-24).

in title

Likewise,

Chappells

and

their

have had the continuous use of the

property south of the fence (T.103 & 125-130).

(This paragraph

restates and agrees with the statement made by Appellants on
page 5 of their Brief).

12

Tr.27, 28, 45, 46.
Ex. 13: Letter from Marion Chappell to Van Dyke:
"Enclosed please find your check. I am sending it to
you as payment of rent on your property that I have been using
for the past three years. Also as payment for damage to your
property.
You sent a message that you had changed your mind
again and that I could leave the corrals. . .
I will use my own property from now on. . .
The only reason I asked you for permission to build
them at all was I hoped I could buy another acre from you. You
said you would think about it everytime I asked you. June 8th
you said NO. The corrals will be torn down as soon as I can."
13

14

Ex. 13. See Note 12.

Tr.27,28. Witness: Welby Van Dyk0
Ex.13:

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court correctly ruled that an ancient fenceline
in existence for 77 years was acquiesced in by the adjoining
proprietors and became the boundary as a matter of law.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EXISTING FENCE HAS BEEN OBSERVED, ACQUIESCED IN,
REPAIRED AND MAINTAINED BY THE PARTIES FOR A PERIOD
OF 77 YEARS PRIOR TO THE EXISTING BOUNDARY DISPUTE.
In this case, the Trial Court heard the evidence offered,
made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.55-62; copies
are attached to Appellants' Brief) finding and concluding that
the fenceline is the boundary between the parties rather than
the new survey line.

The decision of the Court was based on

the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
In Staker vs. Ainsworth, 125 Utah Adv.Rep. 25, (Opinion
filed January 8, 1990) Justice Durham outlined the doctrine:
Historically,
the
doctrine
of
boundary
by
acquiescence included four factors: "(1) occupation
up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or
buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a
boundary, (3) for a long period of time (4) by
adjoining landowners.11
Goodman vs. Wilkinson, 629
P2d 447, 448 (Utah 1981); 12 Am.Jur.2d Boundaries,
§85 (1964 & Supp. 1989). In Halladay vs. Cluff. 685
P2d 500 (Utah 1984), this Court added a fifth element
to this list of factors: "objective uncertainty" as
defined in that case.
To the extent that Halladay vs. Cluff, and its progeny
6

added the fifth requirement of "objective uncertainty" that
requirement was overruled by Staker.
The facts in this case are to be reviewed in the light
most favorable to the Findings of Fact made by the District
Court.
298.

Valley Bank & Trust Co. vs. First Security. 538 P2d
This Court has held the standard 4>f review in connection

with a Finding of Fact made by the Trial Judge requires the
Finding to be upheld even though the Supreme Court may disagree
with him. (Id.)
To demonstrate the Findings are supported by the evidence,
the Respondent's Statement of Facts has been documented to the
transcript, exhibits and record.

We briefly review the facts

here in the light of the four factors required to be proved by
Van Dyke.
1.

Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments,
fences or boundaries.

The fence was built prior to 1911 and permanent poles and
posts installed by Benjamin Turner, predecessor in title to Van
Dyke and by George Chappell, predecessor in title to Chappells.
The fence was repaired and improved by replacing part of the
poles with net wire in the year of 1933 or 1934.
Van

Dyke's

predecessor

in

interest,

Benjamin

Turner,

furnished the materials to go into the fence and the owners of
the property on the south (predecessors to Chappells) furnished
the labor for the fence repair and neither the alignment nor
the location was changed.
2.

Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary.
7

Van Dyke and his predecessors raised livestock on the
property on the north.

The livestock included cattle, sheep,

turkeys, chickens and goats.

They fed sheep in the disputed

area and used the disputed area for grazing, corrals and for
the maintaining of livestock.
Chappells used the property on the south of the fenceline
for

the

raising

of

livestock

for

farming

and

for

other

purposes.
We agree with Appellant's statement on page 5 of their
brief:
Van Dyke and his predecessors in title have had the
continuous use and occupancy of the real property
north of the old fenceline (T.19-24).
Likewise,
Chcippells and their predecessors in title have had
the continuous use of the property south of the fence
(T.103 & 124-130).
3.

For a long period of time.

Although the term
boundary

by

"long period of time" to establish

acquiescence

is

not

set specifically

by Utah

decisions, it is provided in the case of Hobson vs. Panauitch
Lake,

530

P2d

792

(Utah

1975)

that

only

under

unusual

circumstances would a common law prescriptive period of less
than

20

years

be

sufficient

to

establish

a

boundary

by

acquiescence.
The third

factor is met by the evidence in this case

showing the fence to have been in existence for substantially
more thcin 20 years.

The fence was erected about the year of

1911 and was repaired and extended in the year of 1933 or 1934.
Therefore, more than 77 years have elapsed since the original
8

construction of the fence and more than 53 years have elapsed
since the repair and extension•

The time period is computed to

the year of 1988 which is the year this action to quiet title
was filed.

Marian Glen Chappell, Appellant, testified at trial

concerning the ancient fence:
Tr. 121:

By Mr. Olsen:

Q

Marion, how long have you been acquainted with the
particular property where your home is now located?

A

Oh, probably ever since I was big enough to walk.

Q

How old are you now?

A

37.

Q

During your entire lifetime has the fence been there?

A

Yes. It has.

4.

By adjoining landowners.

Van Dyke and Chappells are adjoining landowners as shown
by the deeds of the parties, Exs. 6 & 19 and the plats which
are Exhibits 8, 9 and 17. The fact is also acknowledged by all
witnesses testifying.
POINT II
THE STATUS OF A BOUNDARY LINE FENCE IS NOT CHANGED BY
THE FACT THE FENCE ALSO CONTROLS LIVESTOCK OF
ADJOINING LANDOWNERS.
Appellants

suggest

that

since both

parties and their

predecessors have had livestock from time to time which had to
be controlled that the fence was built to control livestock and
was never intended as a boundary fence.
This is not the evidence.

The evidence is that the fence

was built about 1911 and repaired and improved in 1933 or 1934.
9

The exact agreement between the original builders cannot be
proved because they are deceased.

It is suggested that Van

Dyke has the burden of proving boundary by agreement or his
cause of action fails.

This is an incorrect view of Utah law.

The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and burden of proof of
the parties is outlined by the Court in Motzkus vs. Carroll, 7
U2d 237, 322 P2d 391, pg. 396 (Utah 1958).

Justice Wade,

writing for the Court, stated:
[It] is clear that where a party by evidence
establishes a long period of acquiescence in a fence
as marking the boundary line between two tracts, he
is not required to also produce evidence that the
location of the true boundary line was unknown,
uncertain or in dispute. The development of a long
period of acquiescence in a fence as marking the
boundary line between the two tracts by the
respective owners gives rise to a presumption that
the true boundary line was in dispute or uncertain,
which places, at least, the burden of producing
evidence that there was no dispute or uncertainty but
that the true boundary line was known to the
respective owners on the party claiming that such was
the fact. Where, as here, there is (no) evidence on
that question other than the proof of acquiescence in
the fence as marking the boundary line for the
required long period of time the trial court must
find that the boundary line by acquiescence has been
established. (Emphasis added)

POINT III
A SHOWING OF OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE TRUE
BOUNDARY LINE IS NOT REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW.
Although extensive proof was directed to this point below,
the requirement of "objective uncertainty" added by Halladay
vs. Cluff. (supra) has been overruled by Staker vs. Ainsworth,
(supra).

Therefore, this point is not pursued.
10

CONCLUSION
Van

Dyke

has

met

his

burden

of proving

the ancient

fenceline between the parties was a boundary by acquiescence.
He

has

shown

predecessors

(1)

up

to

occupation

by

a

boundary

marked

the

parties
fence;

and

their

(2) mutual

acquiescence in the fenceline as a boundary; (3) for a long
period of time which is in excess of 77 years; and (4) that the
acquiescence

was

by

adjoining

landowners

and

their

predecessors.
The Trial Court correctly so ruled and the fenceline is
the boundary line between the parties as a matter of law.
Van Dyke, therefore, respectfully requests that the Trial
Court be affirmed.
DATED this 9th day of March, 1990.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBERLAIN
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVED the foregoing Brief of Respondent upon Appellants
by

hand

delivering

to

their

attorney, Mr. Marcus Taylor,

Labrum, Taylor & Blackwell, Attorneys at Law, P. 0. Box 728,
108 North Main, Richfield, Utah (84701) four (4) full, true and
correct copies thereof on this 9th day of March, 1990.
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